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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Saturday April 9, 1977

CG NIDC 77-82C

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Top Secret

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, April 9, 1977.

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

Beginning April 7, NID Cable articles will have a lead, summary paragraph to assist the reader in scanning the cable.

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ZAIRE: Situation Report

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[redacted] Moroccan troops began arriving in Zaire [redacted]

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[redacted] The Moroccans will most likely be used to help Zairian troops defend the key mining center of Kolwezi, a major objective of the Katangan invaders. Moroccan troops may also be sent to forward positions along the main road to the west of Kolwezi so they can be brought to bear before the Katangans reach the town's outskirts.

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[redacted] The Zairian military's main shortcoming since the invasion began last month has clearly been an unwillingness to fight. The infusion of Moroccan troops into Shaba may stiffen Zairian resistance to the invaders and perhaps even provide the government with the means to counterattack.

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[redacted] Moroccan ground forces [redacted]

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[redacted] are considered to be relatively well trained and disciplined. If they are used in a defensive role or can employ conventional tactics, they should be effective against the Katangans.

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[redacted] The Moroccans may run into difficulties, however, if the Katangans rely heavily on such guerrilla tactics as ambushes, sniping, and night fighting. Over the past year, attempts by Moroccan forces to fight a guerrilla war against the Polisario Front in Western Sahara have been largely ineffective, and it is possible that, if confronted with similar tactics in Shaba, the Moroccans will lose interest in aiding the Zairians.

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[redacted] While Moroccan troops are arriving in Zaire, the Katangans apparently are again pushing eastward in Shaba.

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[redacted] News of the impending arrival of Moroccan troops may give renewed impetus to the Katangan drive.

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[redacted] //Zaire is now receiving military assistance from France, Belgium, and Morocco, with the possibility of Egyptian support to come when the high-level Egyptian team now in Kinshasa returns to Cairo next week with its report. China is also sending an aircraft and a ship, probably carrying military equipment. Nonmilitary assistance, mostly food, has been sent by Uganda and Ivory Coast.//

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[redacted] //Morocco King Hassan's decision to send troops to Zaire was partially motivated by a desire to demonstrate his solidarity with moderate African states, such as Zaire, that have supported Rabat in its continuing dispute with Algeria over Western Sahara. Rabat has announced that the troops were sent in response to Zaire's appeal to the members of the OAU for assistance. The Moroccans also probably hope that their support for Zaire will result in future diplomatic support or additional arms sales from the US and other Western powers.//

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[redacted] //Morocco, France, Belgium, and Egypt have all been deeply concerned over the spread of Soviet influence in Africa since the Cuban intervention in Angola. In what they perceive as the inability of the US to provide direct military

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assistance to Zaire, these countries apparently concluded that a more meaningful West European advisory role, coupled with relatively well-trained troops from moderate North African states, could serve to bail the Zairian President out of his predicament in Shaba.//

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SPAIN: Day of Struggle

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Several Basque political parties plan to go ahead with public celebrations of Basque National Day in Vitoria tomorrow, despite a government order prohibiting the gathering. The government cited the likelihood that extremist groups, which have called for "a day of struggle," would threaten public order. Confrontations between the Basques and Spanish security forces are likely.

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Many Basque prisoners are still in jail, despite assurances the Basques say they had from Prime Minister Suarez that the prisoners would be free by tomorrow; this also is playing into the hands of extremists. Relatives of the prisoners began a hunger strike in Vitoria this week to publicize their goal of total amnesty.

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PHILIPPINES: Referendum

Only about a week remains before a referendum is held on self-government for the 13 southwestern provinces of the Philippines, including five with strong Muslim majorities.

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President Marcos has all but assured the Christian majority in the southern Philippines that the central government has not altered its traditional position and is not about to allow genuine autonomy in the south.

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[REDACTED] The Muslim rebels probably realize that the most they can hope for in the referendum on April 17 is for the five provinces with strong Muslim majorities to elect autonomy. The questions on the referendum allow individual provinces the right to opt out of the proposed autonomous region.

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[REDACTED] Leaders of the Moro National Liberation Front, the Muslim separatists' political organization, have not yet accepted the agreement on establishing an autonomous region reached by Libyan President Qadhafi and Marcos' wife in mid-March.

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[REDACTED] In accordance with the agreement, Marcos has offered 15 Muslim rebel leaders, including the Moro National Liberation Front leader, posts in an interim provisional government for the autonomous region, but only a few have responded affirmatively thus far.

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[REDACTED] The Philippine government may yet postpone the referendum if Marcos considers there is a risk of renewed hostilities. The Philippine armed forces remain on alert, and radical Muslims are preparing to fight if the agreement fails. [REDACTED]

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